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SEVENTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 911 (1994) of 21 April 1994, under which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 22 October 1994. This report provides an update on events in Liberia since my last report, of 26 August 1994 (S/1994/1006), as well as recommendations for the planning of future United Nations peace-keeping involvement in Liberia.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

A. Mission to Liberia of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

2. In my last report (S/1994/1006), I noted my increasing concern about the recent evolution of the situation and the absence of progress in the peace process in Liberia. I informed the Security Council that I had decided to send to Liberia a fact-finding mission, headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, as Special Envoy, to review the situation, in consultation with my Special Representative to Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, with a view to assisting me in determining options for the future United Nations role in facilitating the peace process in that country.

3. During his mission, from 16 to 26 August, the Special Envoy met, inter alia, representatives of the Liberian National Transitional Government, the leaders of the factions and other prominent Liberians. He held consultations with the Field Commander of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Major-General John Inienger, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Eminent Person for Liberia, Reverend Canaan Banana. He also met the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and President Henri Konan Bedie of Côte d'Ivoire.

4. The main findings of the Special Envoy were the following:

(a) The governance of Liberia has been seriously affected by the inability of the five-member Council of State to reach consensus on most issues and by the lack of resources available to the Government to administer the country;

(b) The factions have not shown the commitment and political will required for implementation of the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272, annex). The command and control difficulties within the factions have contributed to the instability of the security situation and to the lack of success of the disarmament process. Furthermore, the flow of arms and ammunition to the various factions has added to the crisis;

(c) A number of significant questions in regard to the electoral process remain unanswered, including the electoral system to be adopted, the repatriation of refugees, and resources required to carry out the elections;

(d) The limited financing available to ECOMOG has been a significant factor in hampering the group's ability to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. ECOMOG has not been able to provide security for unarmed UNOMIL military observers in accordance with that Agreement and agreements reached between the United Nations and ECOWAS.

5. The Special Envoy pointed out that a number of lessons have been learned over the past year in regard to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and that, on this basis, the United Nations and ECOWAS could introduce improvements to the initial concept upon which the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOWAS was based. In this connection, he made the following recommendations on the future role of UNOMIL in Liberia:

(a) The United Nations and ECOWAS should consult on the latter's future strategy for ECOMOG, and on the role of UNOMIL in relation to that strategy;

(b) The political support of the international community for the regional peace-keeping efforts undertaken by ECOWAS in Liberia should be accompanied by the substantial financial support which ECOMOG needs to be able to carry out its responsibilities effectively;

(c) Given the security situation in the country and the fact that ECOMOG cannot provide the necessary protection for UNOMIL unarmed military observers, UNOMIL should be reduced to about one third of its present authorized strength of 368 (including engineering and medical support elements);

(d) With regard to internal security, the issue of a national army should be addressed and donor Governments should provide technical assistance and other resources necessary for the formation of a new army.

6. In conclusion, the Special Envoy pointed out that since Liberia is a small country, with a small population, the world does not seem to pay much attention to the suffering of its people. He stressed that while this was to some extent understandable, experience had shown elsewhere that failure to mobilize the necessary resources at an early stage might well lead, later on, to even more costly operations. He also pointed out that, if left unchecked, the crisis in

Liberia would undoubtedly affect the stability of its direct neighbours - as it is already doing - as well as the stability of West Africa.

7. Several significant events took place, shortly after the Special Envoy left Liberia, and these have affected the peace process. First, the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, convened a meeting of the leaders of the warring factions on 7 September at Akosombo, Ghana, to review the continuing delays in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The meeting was attended by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah and a delegation of General Roosevelt Johnson, representing both wings of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and General Hezekiah Bowen, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Although invited, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) declined to attend the meeting. Representatives of the Liberian National Transitional Government, OAU and the United Nations were present as facilitators. The meeting culminated in the signing, on 12 September, of a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement. Although General Johnson's wing of ULIMO did not sign the agreement, he sent a letter to the Chairman of ECOWAS on 2 October, informing the Chairman of his acceptance of the agreement.

8. Secondly, the Liberian National Conference, a citizens' initiative, convened on 24 August to deliberate on the many aspects of the peace process. After extended sessions, lasting until 3 October, the Conference adopted a set of resolutions concerning the peace process and suspended further consultations for a period of two months, after which time it plans to reconvene to assess progress made in regard to disarmament and demobilization.

9. Thirdly, a dissident group within the Armed Forces of Liberia attempted to stage a coup against the Liberian National Transitional Government on 15 September. The attempted coup was successfully foiled by ECOMOG.

B. Akosombo Agreement

10. The objective of the Akosombo Agreement was to add further detail to those aspects of the Cotonou Agreement which were too general or, for other reasons, had proved deficient in their implementation. The Agreement reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement as the only framework for peace in Liberia. It sought to strengthen the role of the Liberian National Transitional Government in governing the country during the transitional period by giving it a more central role in the supervision and monitoring of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. In this regard, it also stated that all decisions of the Council of State should be made on the basis of a simple majority, as opposed to the Cotonou Agreement's provision for consensus, which had left the Council unable to reach decisions. Nominees to the Council of State would be changed, with each of the signatories to the agreement (AFL, NPFL, ULIMO) appointing one new member. The remaining two members, representing unarmed Liberians, would each be appointed by the Liberian National Conference and jointly by ULIMO and NPFL. Participation in the Transitional Legislative Assembly would be broadened by adding 13 representatives from the various counties.

11. In regard to military aspects, the Akosombo Agreement called for the immediate re-establishment of the cease-fire and provided more details concerning its implementation, the disengagement of forces and the responsibilities of the factions with regard to the assembly and disarmament of combatants. It provided for a more realistic package of incentives for demobilization, including arrangements for internal security and planning for a new national army. The Agreement foresaw that if disarmament and demobilization took place according to the agreed schedule, general elections could be held by October 1995.

12. The Akosombo Agreement also further outlined the peace enforcement powers of ECOMOG, and, in so doing, provided a more central role to the Liberian National Transitional Government. It specified that should any faction or group refuse to desist from acts in violation of the Agreement, the Transitional Government, in collaboration with ECOMOG, would have the power to use the necessary force available to assure compliance. Furthermore, under the Agreement, the Transitional Government would conclude a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS.

13. The conclusion of the Agreement coincided with an upsurge of fighting in and around Gbarnga, the headquarters of NPFL, NPFL being attacked by ULIMO-Kromah and the coalition of LPC, ULIMO-Johnson, AFL and NPFL breakaway ministers. This attack, according to some reports, was carried out with the clandestine support of some elements within ECOMOG.

14. Soon after its signing, the Akosombo Agreement became engulfed in controversy as members of the Liberian National Transitional Government and various Liberian interest groups called its validity into question. Reservations were expressed regarding the credibility of the signatories who, while negotiating at Akosombo, were also engaged in military confrontation on the ground. Given the breakdown of command and control within the factions, doubts were also raised regarding the capacity of those who signed the agreement to deliver on their commitments. In addition, the provision permitting the factions to change their nominees in the existing Council of State and in the Cabinet of the Liberian National Transitional Government was strongly criticized.

15. In view of the reactions to the Akosombo Agreement, the Chairman of ECOWAS sent a delegation to Monrovia on 17 September and, thereafter, invited prominent Liberian civilians and representatives of the Liberian National Conference to meet him at Accra on 18 September. The purpose of those meetings was to explain the rationale behind the Agreement and to discuss issues of concern which created opposition to it. As a result of those consultations, opposition to the Akosombo Agreement has reportedly diminished. To date, however, there has been no movement towards its implementation.

C. Liberian National Conference

16. The Liberian National Conference, like the Akosombo Agreement, reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement as the only framework for restoring peace and ensuring good governance in Liberia. Like the Akosombo Agreement, it sought to enable

the Liberian National Transitional Government to play a more central role in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement.

17. The Conference made a number of important recommendations regarding disarmament, governance and the electoral process, which converge with the Akosombo Agreement and could serve to advance the peace process. The Conference called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, deployment of ECOMOG throughout the country, comprehensive disarmament and demobilization within a 60-day period, and a series of punitive actions, including enforcement against those parties that failed to comply. The Conference recommended the establishment of a Disarmament and Demobilization Compliance Committee to monitor progress. It also recommended the establishment of a Peace Enforcement and Demobilization Fund, calling on the international community to mobilize resources for ECOMOG and on the Liberian National Transitional Government to contribute $1 million to the fund. Like the Akosombo Agreement, the Conference also highlighted the importance of a reconstituted national army and, in this connection, called for the reorganization and restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia during the transitional period.

18. As regards strengthening the ability of the Liberian National Transitional Government to govern the country, the Conference, like the Akosombo Agreement, called on the Council of State to adopt its rules of procedure quickly. It also called for the Transitional Legislative Assembly to be expanded by an additional 13 persons, representing each of Liberia's counties. The most significant point of divergence between the resolutions of the Conference and the Akosombo Agreement is that the Conference called for the retention of the existing members on the Council of State, conferring upon the Chairman the functions of Head of State, while the Akosombo Agreement permitted the factions to review the status of their appointees and to effect changes in the current membership.

19. With respect to the holding of elections, both the Akosombo Agreement and the Liberian National Conference concurred on a similar time-frame, with elections scheduled to take place around October 1995. However, while both the Cotonou and the Akosombo agreements were silent on the system to be adopted for the elections, the Conference proposed that the existing system, based on absolute majority, be retained for electing the President, Vice-President and Senators, with a change to proportional representation for elections to the House of Representatives.

20. The Conference recognized the role of the Chairman of ECOWAS in facilitating the peace process and called on him to continue consultations with and among Liberians in his search for peace in the country.

21. The attempted coup by dissidents within the Armed Forces of Liberia came at a time when the Liberian National Transitional Government was seeking to restore the army to its constitutional status. This decision was supported by the Liberian National Conference, which called for the reorganization and restructuring of AFL to reflect geographic and ethnic balance. Decisive action by ECOMOG in terminating the coup attempt has been followed by the partial disarming of AFL in its barracks at the Barclay Training Centre and at Camp Schefflin. However, it has been reported that some AFL elements may have joined LPC and/or ULIMO-Johnson in their efforts against NPFL. Relations between AFL

and the Liberian National Transitional Government have been further complicated by the attempt of the Chairman of the Council of State to remove the current Chief of Staff, who has refused to step down, supported by his nominated replacement and the AFL high command.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Situation on the ground

22. As indicated in my report of 26 August (S/1994/1006), in July 1994 a coalition of forces was formed by AFL, LPC and ULIMO-Johnson. Reports indicated that the principal objective of the coalition, supported by NPFL breakaway ministers in the Liberian National Transitional Government, was to defeat Charles Taylor and capture Gbarnga. Around mid-August, troops began to congregate in the Bong Mines and Kakata area, planning a move against Gbarnga. There are reports that some elements of ECOMOG (see para. 13 above), as well as some prominent Liberians, may have supported those efforts.

23. Charles Taylor's departure from Liberia on 6 September to attend the Akosombo meeting exacerbated the breakdown in NPFL command, thereby providing the opportunity for Alhaji Kromah's wing of ULIMO to attack Gbarnga and take control of Taylor's headquarters on 8 September. At this point, on 9 September, 43 unarmed United Nations military observers and six non-governmental organization personnel were detained by NPFL. The breakdown of command and control in NPFL-held areas and the taking of Taylor's headquarters at Gbarnga provided the coalition forces with the opportunity to launch a series of attacks against Taylor's forces in the northern and eastern regions of the country.

24. Over the course of the past few months, a number of counties in the south-eastern part of the country have come under the control of LPC. NPFL now seems to control parts of Nimba and Bong counties, as well as some parts of northern Grand Gedeh and Margibi. ULIMO-Johnson is still in control of Grand Cape Mount, Bomi and lower Lofa counties and has repelled recent incursions on Tubmanburg by ULIMO-Kromah, reportedly assisted by some elements of ECOMOG. Upper Lofa continues to be under the control of ULIMO-Kromah. Margibi county, especially between Kakata and Konola, is an area of intense fighting between NPFL and coalition forces, as the latter attempt to move northward towards Gbarnga.

25. According to some reports, the various factions continue to receive arms. There are also allegations of complicity on the part of some ECOMOG elements with the warring factions, particularly in regard to the military activities of coalition forces against NPFL. The fact that these allegations persist constitutes an impediment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

26. In recent weeks, ECOMOG has suffered casualties from ambushes by both NPFL and ULIMO-Johnson in the Margibi area. Civilians have also been killed by land-mines planted in an apparent effort to disrupt the advance of coalition forces.

27. Overall, the military situation remains confused, with groups aligning and realigning themselves depending on their short-term interests and the breakdown of command and control within the factions. The situation in Liberia is

reaching the point where warlords, without any particular political agenda but with the control of a certain number of soldiers, are seeking territory for the sake of adding to their own claim to power. Reports indicate that the fighting is likely to persist both within NPFL and between NPFL and rival factions until control of Gbarnga is consolidated. The current fighting in Liberia is small-scale bush fighting. The results are not large military victories, but deaths mostly of civilians, the decimation of entire villages and the breakdown of any semblance of law and order. Most of the fighters are not well trained, but are young men and boys, often with little choice but to be manipulated by the various warlords.

B. UNOMIL operations

28. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement and the UNOMIL concept of operations, unarmed United Nations military observers were to be deployed together with ECOMOG troops which were to provide their security. Given ECOMOG's logistic difficulties, UNOMIL began its deployment before ECOMOG. In so doing, UNOMIL sought and received the commitment of the factions to ensure the security of its military observers. The first months of such deployment went smoothly. ECOMOG soon followed the UNOMIL deployment pattern in some areas, including Gbarnga in the northern region. However, in July of this year, because of the already deteriorating security situation, especially in the western region, UNOMIL deployment was reduced from 29 to 21 team sites.

29. On 9 September, NPFL elements detained 43 unarmed UNOMIL military observers and 6 non-governmental organization personnel at nine sites in the northern and eastern regions, confiscating their transport, communications and most other equipment. This occurred soon after Charles Taylor's headquarters was taken by ULIMO-Kromah. It is felt that the detention of those personnel may have been a premeditated action on the part of NPFL (1) to use the observers as a shield against attacks by renegade NPFL forces or rival factions, and (2) to secure reliable communication and transportation facilities from UNOMIL and non-governmental organizations to further their war efforts.

30. Immediately after the crisis began on 9 September, UNOMIL undertook round-the-clock contacts with faction representatives, NPFL interlocutors, neighbouring countries and ECOMOG in order to secure the release of those detained. On my instructions, my Special Representative personally informed Charles Taylor that the United Nations held him responsible for the welfare of the UNOMIL military observers and non-governmental organization personnel being held in his area and demanded their immediate release and the return of their property. I also sent a message to the Chairman of ECOWAS, stressing ECOMOG's responsibilities regarding the security of UNOMIL personnel and urging him to exert pressure on Taylor to release those detained and to remind the other factions of their responsibilities under the Cotonou Agreement to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

31. On 14 September, 33 United Nations military observers were released and found their way to relative safety. An attempted helicopter rescue of the United Nations military observers stationed at Harper was aborted when the helicopter was shot at by NPFL elements and forced to leave the area after

rescuing 2 of the 12 observers detained there. On the same day, the ECOMOG contingent from the United Republic of Tanzania located at Gbarnga attempted to move with six UNOMIL military observers and six non-governmental organization personnel to Monrovia. When the convoy was between Konola and Kakata in Margibi county it was ambushed by elements of ULIMO-Johnson. Two Tanzanian soldiers were killed (a third later died from his wounds), seven were wounded and four were captured by ULIMO-Johnson troops. UNOMIL was able to airlift the United Nations, non-governmental organization and some ECOMOG personnel from Konola to Monrovia. However, further attempts to reach Kakata were aborted when the Tanzanian battalion was ambushed by ULIMO-Johnson. The troops eventually all reached Kakata, but the contingent was looted of its arms and equipment by NPFL in the process. Among the material looted by NPFL was a container of 492 weapons which had been handed over earlier by disarming combatants and was located at the Konola encampment site.

32. By 18 September, all military observers and non-governmental organization personnel had been released. The conduct of the observers under detention was exemplary in every respect. However, some of them, especially those held at Harper, were mistreated, beaten and terrorized by those who had detained them. NPFL has retained all of UNOMIL's transport, communications and other equipment, and, except in a few cases, observers were not permitted to carry personal items with them when they were released.

33. Given the breakdown in the cease-fire and the fact that, as experience has shown, ECOMOG cannot provide security for unarmed UNOMIL military observers, UNOMIL is unable, at this time, to carry out many of its mandated activities. As a result, all UNOMIL team sites have been evacuated except for those in the Monrovia area. It has also been decided to reduce, as a temporary measure, the personnel of UNOMIL from its authorized strength of 368 (including engineering and medical elements) to approximately 90 observers. Accordingly, as at 12 October, the military strength of UNOMIL stands at 190. Some observers have been transferred to other United Nations peace-keeping operations. This temporary reduction in the military component will be matched by a commensurate reduction in the civilian staff.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

34. Since my last report, the suffering of the population in rural Liberia has significantly increased. The turmoil that has followed the factional fighting over the past several weeks has resulted in some 200,000 persons being uprooted from their places of temporary or permanent residence. In the counties of Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Lofa, Grand Bassa, River Cess, Nimba and Maryland, UNOMIL overflights have confirmed that whole towns and villages have been evacuated and their populations decimated. The insecurity has resulted in the closure of all major roadways and terminated all forms of communication in rural areas. Displaced persons and refugees who have fled to Monrovia and across the borders of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire tell of the horror of indiscriminate killings, torture, rape, destruction of property and looting of personal effects. Refugees also report that thousands of other Liberians have sought refuge in the forested areas and are unable to move because of the insecurity.

35. At Nzérékoré, Guinea, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that, since 14 September, food aid and other assistance has been provided for over 45,000 newly arrived refugees. That is expected to increase further as the fighting in Bong county continues. At Tabou, Côte d'Ivoire, UNHCR also reports that over 30,000 new refugees have been registered during the same period.

36. Because of insecurity, international and local relief organizations located in Liberia have not been able to deal with the growing tragedy inside the country and this has had disastrous consequences for those in need. For example, before the fighting, the World Food Programme provided nearly 4,000 metric tons of food each month for approximately 420,000 suffering Liberians in Nimba, Margibi and Bong counties. These resources were distributed by five relief agencies. Insecurity has now reached levels that make it impossible for the movement of relief supplies, including across the border from Côte d'Ivoire, leaving thousands without access to the assistance on which they depend to cover their basic needs.

37. Many of the emergency relief projects of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in water, sanitation, child trauma counselling and immunization have been interrupted by the fighting. In Bong county, over the past several weeks, UNICEF has lost nearly $1 million worth of drugs and supplies through looting of warehouses. Local non-governmental organizations still present in the area do not have supplies to distribute. In addition, water projects, schools, health centres and hospital sanitation projects have been abandoned.

38. The Phebe hospital, the major secondary health care institution serving Bong county, has been ransacked and looted. As a result of the fighting at Gbarnga, some 30,000 residents had sought sanctuary near the hospital. During the last week of September, fighters attacked and killed several hospital workers and internally displaced persons. Survivors have fled to the bush, and no official report on their overall condition has since been received. UNOMIL is seeking the approval of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire for assessment missions to their border areas where the majority of refugees are currently located. The missions will include members of the United Nations and the non-governmental organization community. Information gathered will facilitate decision-making and refine emergency assistance strategies to be carried out upon the cessation of hostilities.

39. Since the commencement of renewed hostilities, humanitarian relief agencies, the United Nations system and UNOMIL have lost over 80 jeeps and trucks, tens of thousands of gallons of fuel, hundreds of tons of rice, beans and other relief items, communications equipment and supplies and materials worth several million dollars. The practice of looting transportation and communication assets and supplies is aimed at restocking and re-equipping the fighters to sustain the offensive of their factions. Almost all international relief operations have ceased, except at Buchanan and Monrovia. Whatever little humanitarian assistance is still available is being administered by the national staff of the relief agencies.

40. It is estimated that about one half of the international personnel of relief organizations have left Liberia as a direct result of the insurmountable

difficulties and impossible conditions for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Several staffers have taken up duties across the borders in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea to support ongoing efforts to assist the growing numbers of refugees. However, this is a temporary palliative since such stocks as have not been looted have run dangerously low. There is also no near-term prospect for resupply of food and other assistance given the present dangerous conditions and the increase in the numbers of suffering persons. Public appeals to the factions for the creation of zones of tranquillity and a cessation of hostilities have gone unheeded, as have calls for respect and sanctity of facilities such as hospitals and health centres.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

41. The General Assembly, by its resolutions 48/247 A and 48/247 B of 5 April and 29 July 1994, respectively, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in the amount of $23 million gross for the mandate period ending 22 October 1994, for the maintenance of UNOMIL. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of the Mission beyond 22 October 1994, at the reduced strength indicated in paragraph 33 above, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of the Mission.

42. As at 10 October 1994, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMIL special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to $5.8 million. In order to provide UNOMIL with the necessary cash-flow, a total of $2 million has been borrowed from the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund. This loan remains unpaid. Outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 10 October 1994 totalled $1,416 million.

43. With regard to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement on Liberia, as at 10 October 1994, voluntary contributions received amounted to $17.8 million, of which disbursements totalling $14.5 million have been authorized.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44. The political, military and humanitarian developments of the past month have left Liberia in a desperate state. Long-term peace and stability in the country require genuine reconciliation between all elements of society. The Liberian National Transitional Government, the factions and the people of Liberia need to focus on political accommodation to stop the country from sliding deeper into chaos. In this regard, I support the initiatives taken by President Rawlings and the resolutions of the Liberian National Conference to strengthen the authority of the Liberian National Transitional Government in managing the administration of the country. I call on the Transitional Government to take a more active role in facilitating national reconciliation and I urge all Liberians to take concrete steps towards that end. The Transitional Government, the factions and the other interest groups must remember that it is the civilians, especially those outside the main population centres, who are the most vulnerable to the suffering caused by this conflict.

45. It is obvious that the peace process has stalled. At the ECOWAS summit, held at Abuja on 5 and 6 August, President Rawlings indicated that if there was no progress by the end of the year he would be obliged to consider withdrawing the Ghanaian contingent from ECOMOG. Nigeria has reportedly reduced its presence in ECOMOG while Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania have indicated that they may both withdraw their contingents from the operation. It should be emphasized that the frustration of ECOMOG troop-contributing countries derives both from the lack of financial resources to sustain the operation and from the lack of progress in the peace process to justify their sacrifices. A withdrawal or significant downsizing of ECOMOG in the face of the growing breakdown of law and order in the country will have serious consequences both for Liberia and for the subregion.

46. Reports from all quarters suggest that there can be no military solution to this conflict. The ability of the factions to wage war has undoubtedly been sustained by the continuing supply of arms and ammunition to them. This must stop. I am confident that ECOWAS member States will continue to use their good offices to ensure that the factions are denied any form of support so as to bring the fighting rapidly to a halt. As the ECOWAS summit at Abuja reminded member States, the arms embargo must be implemented rigorously. It should be borne in mind that continuing hostilities in Liberia will undoubtedly affect the stability of the subregion as a whole.

47. In view of the need to consult with ECOWAS on its intentions for ECOMOG and in order to support the recent initiatives by its Chairman, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, I have decided to dispatch a high-level mission to consult him about the respective roles and responsibilities of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, taking recent developments into account. This review will seek to determine how best the international community can continue to assist Liberia in bringing about a cessation of hostilities. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIL for a period of two months to allow the high-level mission time to conduct its work and present its conclusions to me. After consideration of its findings, I shall be in a position to make the appropriate recommendations to the Council on the future role of UNOMIL in Liberia.

48. The quest for peace in Liberia can be successful only if the Liberians demonstrate that they are ready for a genuine national reconciliation based on mutual respect and accommodation. However, while the responsibility for peace in Liberia lies primarily with the Liberians themselves, the fact is that the lack of adequate material support by the international community to the regional effort through ECOMOG has made it more difficult to assist the Liberians in advancing the peace process.

49. In closing, I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer, and to all the military and civilian personnel of UNOMIL. I should like to express my admiration especially for those observers who were detained; they have proved their commitment to peace in Liberia through their commendable behaviour under very trying circumstances. I should also like to thank the Government of Côte d'Ivoire for its assistance in securing the safe release of the detained United Nations and non-governmental organization personnel.

UNOMIL DEPLOYMENT
as of October 1994
Mission Headquarters UNOMIL
Regional Headquarters UNOMIL
Airport Team
Seaport Team
Investigation Team
Cantonment Team
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
LIBERIA
Atlantic Ocean
Western Region
Northern Region
Central Region
Eastern Region
LOFA
BONG
NIMBA
BOMI
GRAND CAPE MOUNT
GRAND BASSA
RIVER CESS
GRAND GEDEH
SINOE
GRAND KRU
MARYLAND
MARGIBI
MONTSERRADO
Mendekoma
Voinjama
Irié
Kailahun
Pendembu
Vahun
Yeala
Zorzor
Nzérékoré
Yekepa
Sanniquellie
Danané
Pujehun
Kongo
Naama Camp
Ganta
Lougatou
Bo
Sulima
Tiene
Kle
Gbarnga
Tubmanburg
Bong Town
Butlo
Robertsport
Lake Piso
Konola
Toulépleu
Todee
Kakata
Tapeta
Monrovia
Tobli
Towai Town
Cale Town
Spriggs Payne Airport
Harbel
Roberts Int'l Airport
Sos Village
Lac
Zwedru
Scheiffelin
Buchanan
Dubwe
Taï
Kaobli
Greenville
Kodeke
Nemeke
Bilapo
Grand Cess
Plibo
Ouaté
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